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Introduction*
Scholarly interest on India’s partition concentrates mostly
on its political and constitutional implications while, as far as
Pakistan is concerned, the historians’ attention focuses more on
the Cold War phase of its history, rather than on the premises to
its foundation.
Pakistan is generally associated with the United States, but
Great Britain had a prominent role in dividing India and,
ultimately, creating Pakistan. The commonly accepted
explanations of India’s partition put the blame for this ruinous
event more on Indian responsibilities than on British intentions.
This explanation is normally associated with the assumption the
British statesmen acted as mere agents who eased decisions
adopted by someone else: the Congress and the Muslim League.
Another explanation is that partition was the only solution to
avoid the worst, like a civil war or a massacre that could have
been worse than the actual carnage following the divide.
However, India’s divide and the birth of three nations that
apparently were two, an unscrupulous experiment dividing a state
into two parts separated by a couple of thousand miles of
northern Indian territory, were too big an affair to be simply
justified by the incapacity of the two main Indian parties, the
Congress and the Muslim League, to find an agreement.
* I wish to thank Michelguglielmo Torri for reading and criticising this
essay and, as always, for his invaluable advice. Of course, it goes
without saying than any remaining imperfections are my own
responsibility.
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Whether all this was unavoidable is open to question.
Probably it is true that a prolonged British permanence
(especially of the army) for a few years after the end of World
War II to guide the parts to a settlement could have been the only
possible alternative to the split, but it was unfeasible. Remaining
in India would have been economically unsustainable and
politically unpopular. After the war, the British attitude was to
get the maximum benefit from the former colonies, especially
from India, with the least effort and expenditure. The US pressure
to put an end to the colonial rule was very strong, while the
international public opinion sympathised more with the colonised
people than with the colonisers. Above all, the Indian nationalists
would not tolerate British rule any longer. A prolonged
permanence of the British Raj in India after World War II would
entail the risk of a perpetual unrest, like in Malaysia, Indonesia,
or Vietnam. The British government was therefore obliged to
respect the pledge made in 1942 that independence would be
granted to India after the end of the war.
However, the necessity of a quick withdrawal does not seem
to be sufficient to explain an enormous event like the partition of
the Indian subcontinent. The existing studies on India’s partition,
although accurate, like Anita Inder Singh’s The Origins of the
Partition of India,1 are based mostly on the Transfer of Power2
series, selected published records that, probably also for a
calculated choice, do not focus much on military and strategic
issues. For this reason, these records do not allow a clear
reconstruction of British responsibilities in India’s partition.
The records on which this essay is based suggest the seeds
of the partition were sown much before 1947 and the British
10                                                                                                               Introduction
1 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India 1936-1947,
Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1987.
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statesmen abetted the divide when it became clear that partition
would be the most profitable choice for British defence
requirements in Asia and the Middle East. The British rulers
knew it would be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain the
colonies after the end of World War II. However, India was too
important for the defence of the remaining British economic
interests in the Middle East and in South-East Asia not to deserve
special attention. When in 1942 the demand of independence by
the Congress became pressing, the British statesmen began to
conceive the option to detach a portion of the territory included
in the Anglo-Indian Empire to maintain the military control of
the Indian subcontinent.
Narendra Singh Sarila in his The Shadow of the Great Game
asserts the provincial option contained in the 1942 Cripps
proposal was deliberately introduced into the constitutional path
for India’s independence to undermine the unity of the Indian
subcontinent and to pave the way to the creation of Pakistan. This
is particularly evident in a letter by Amery, where he explained
the content of the offer to the viceroy: “As for the Congress their
adverse reaction may be all the greater when they discover that
the nest [the offer] contains Pakistan Cookoo’s [sic] egg”.3
Cripps was not only conscious of the disruptive potential of
the offer but apparently endorsed it. In the secret account of his
meeting with Jinnah, Cripps noted “I think he [Jinnah] was rather
surprised in the distance that it [the British offer] went to meet
the Pakistan case”.4
Introduction                                                                                                                11
2 Nicholas Mansergh (ed.), The Transfer of Power 1942-47 (hence
TOP).
3 Narendra Singh Sarila, The Shadow of the Great Game, The Untold
Story of India’s Partition, Harper Collins, Noida, 2005 p. 102, quoting
TOP, vol. I, record no. 296.
4 N.S. Sarila, The Shadow”, ibid. and A. Inder Singh, The Origins of
the Partition of India, p, 76, quoting Note by Cripps on interview with
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This view of the British offer of 1942 is shared by the two
most prominent Indian scholars of the Quit India movement,
M.S. Venkataramani and B.K. Shrivastava who, however, do not
mention Cripps’ secret report.5 According to Anita Inder Singh,
the provincial option did not encourage “the League to settle with
the Congress”. As an evidence, she says that “after Cripps had
discussed his formula with Jinnah”, a proposal by Sikander Hyatt
Khan for a Congress-League settlement was rejected by the
Muslim League Working Committee.6 Dennis Kux, one of the
most prominent American scholars of the US relations with India
and Pakistan, is of the same opinion. According to him, Gandhi
opposed the Cripps mission “mainly because it left open the
possible creation of Pakistan”.7 From 10 May 1942 onwards,
from the columns of the Harijan, Gandhi started to criticise the
partition as if he was conscious the real consequence of the
Cripps offer was India’s “vivisection”.8
Due to Nehru’s and Azad’s firm position regarding defence
during the 1942 negotiations, the British prime minister, the
12                                                                                                               Introduction
Jinnah on 25 March 1942, TOP Vol. I, pp. 480-481 and Cripps to Azad,
2 April 1942, ibid., p. 610.
5 M.S. Venkataramani, B.K. Shrivastava, Quit India. The American
Response to the 1942 Struggle, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi,
1979, pp. 62-95.
6 A. Inder Singh, The Origins, pp. 76-77.
7 On the Cripps Mission and US attempt to facilitate an agreement,
Dennis Kux, India and the Unites States: Estranged Democracies,
1941-1991, National Defence University Press, Washington D.C.,
1993, pp. 12-21 and The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000.
Disenchanted Allies, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2001,
p. 16.
8 N.S. Sarila, p. 132.
Marzia CASOLARI
viceroy, and the military chiefs understood that most probably,
once India became independent, the Congress leadership would
not be willing to share its military responsibilities with its former
rulers.
At the end of 1942, the military began to plan India’s post-
war military settlement and, in the following years until the
thresholds of India’s independence, they carefully examined two
options. One was an independent India bound to Great Britain
by a military treaty. This was certainly the most favourite choice,
but very hard to reach: Indian leaders might not be willing to
militarily cooperate with Great Britain. The other choice was
detaching a portion of former British India to build up a new state
where to set up the military bases required for the continuation
of the defence of British interests in the region and worldwide.
This ‘B plan’ was gradually prepared and put in action when it
became clear that it was the most convenient option for the
preservation of British interests in South Asia. This essay
reconstructs the evolution of the ‘Pakistan option’ from the
Cripps Mission (1942) to the Cabinet Mission (1946).
The Government of India and the future of the Indian
armed forces after the war
The Government of India began to project India’s post-war
settlement at the end of 1942. The main concern of both civil and
military authorities was the future of the Indian army. “For some
months I have had at the back of my mind the question of what
the future of the Indian Army is to be”.9 So wrote General Robert
The Government of India and the future of the Indian armed forces…    13
9 India Office Records (hence IOR), L/WS/1/1340, note The Post-War
Indian Army, dated 3.12.42, signed with Robert Lockhart initials.
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Lockhart, then military secretary to the India Office in December
1942.
The uncertainty about the future of the Indian army
originated a series of other issues concerning the post-war
political developments in India. The fundamental question had
been “Was India going to be a dominion or become independent
or what?” This doubt was still roaming in the minds of the British
officers at the threshold of India’s independence. The question
of the future of the Indian army was complicated and had several
political implications connected with the political status of India
and, ultimately, with its territorial features.
Even if we accept the Secretary of State’s assumption as meaning
that the present Government of India Act will remain the legal
instrument under which India will be governed, it will still be a
matter of uncertainty what type of Government will govern India
within the terms of that Act.10
The uncertainty about the future government and about
India’s future political status occurred within an unsettled
international context and
any scheme which Sir C. Auchinleck may produce for the future
of the Indian Army is vitally dependent both on the general post-
war settlement and on its particular application on India, since
14    The Government of India and the future of the Indian armed forces…
Lockhart held the position of military secretary to the India Office until
1943. After a brilliant career in the army, on 15 August 1947 he was
appointed Commander-in-Chief, Indian army, with the rank of acting
General and was promoted General on 1 September.
10 Ibid., draft of a letter from G. A. Simpson to General Lockhart, dated
5/12 [1942].
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the future of the Indian Army is inextricably interwoven with the
future condition of the world and of Asia.11
The problem of the future of the Indian army was so
essential Lockhart suggested “a committee should be formed in
England of senior and experienced officers to examine the whole
question and make recommendations”12 The committee was to
be chaired by Claude Auchinleck, Commander in Chief (hence
C.-in-C.) of the Indian army.13
The correspondence between the British authorities
emphasised the need of modernising the Indian army, especially
from the technical point of view. They noticed the war introduced
tremendous technological progress in weapons, transport,
equipment, and fighting techniques. The backbone of the modern
warfare was airpower.
Furthermore, the international situation originated by the
war presented new strategic challenges. On 15 January 1943, the
secretary of state for India, Lord Leo Amery, wrote to General
Wavell:
What applies to the later stages of this war – I am thinking of the
eastern campaigns of 1944, 45 and 46 – will apply even more to
the future organisation of all defence forces and perhaps even
more particularly to those of India. It is not only within India itself
that air carriage of troops may be of immense importance for
The Government of India and the future of the Indian armed forces…    15
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., note by Lockhart, 3.12.42.
13 Ibid., Extract from private letter from Lord Linlithgow to Mr. Amery,
dated 28 December, 1942, extract from private letter from Mr. Amery
to Lord Linlithgow, dated 11 January 1943, telegram from the viceroy
dated 12 January 1943 to Mr. Simpson and General Lockhart.
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internal security and for defence against an actual invader if he
reached India: I am thinking even more of the possibilities of
intercepting invasion on the periphery of India, i.e. in Persia,
Afghanistan, Burma, Malaya, etc. In all these regions ground
communication is infinitely slow and cumbrous and the army
which can move by air and move its fighter air squadrons by air,
will have an enormous advantage over any army organized on
relatively old-fashioned lines.14
On the same day, Amery wrote to the viceroy. According to
the secretary of state, “the really big problem” regarding the
whole question of the reform of the Indian army was the technical
development of modern weapons, especially air weapons.
There is to begin with the whole question of the extent to which
the air fighting services of one kind or another should displace
relatively both ground troops and navy from the point of view of
Indian defence. There is secondly the whole question of
mechanical warfare, how far the tank is really the weapon of the
future or likely to be kept within compass by the development of
anti-tank gun and self-propelled field artillery. Lastly, but possibly
the most important factor of the lot, is the extent to which both
ground troops and the ground equipment of air fighting services
are going to depend upon air transport. My own view is that the
airborne and air supplied division is going to be the really
governing factor in the later stages of this war and still more in
future wars.15
16    The Government of India and the future of the Indian armed forces…
14 Ibid., Extract from letter from Mr. Amery to General Wavell, dated
15 January, 1943. Apparently, the British authorities expected the war
to continue until 1946.
15 Ibid., Extract from private letter from Mr. Amery to Lord Linlithgow
dated 15 January, 1943.
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On 16 January 1943 Lord Linlithgow wrote to General
Wavell for consultation.16 Replying to the viceroy, Wavell
insisted on the demobilisation of the Indian army. Unlike the
viceroy and the secretary of state, he was not in favour of
establishing a committee to examine the future of the Indian
army. According to him, the British authorities should, first of
all, “have some ideas of both the strategical (sic) position in India
after the war”. Wavell emphasised the political implications of
the future of the Indian army and remarked that the political
future of India was uncertain.
The political factors will be much harder to determine. We may
assume that some form of Indian National government is likely
to be in power within a year or so from the conclusion of the war;
but what form that government will take, i.e. whether it will
include the whole of India, or whether some provinces may
secede; whether it will include the Indian States; what its attitude
towards British assistance will be, and so forth, will be difficult
matters on which to make assumptions.17
Linlithgow agreed with the C-in-C18 “that the vital factor in
any calculation” was “the political status of India after the War”.
The viceroy was pessimistic
about the prospect of any solution coming out of the post-war
constitutional discussions. I am very doubtful indeed whether we
shall ever get the main parties even to meet round the table. I am
quite certain that any conclusions that did emerge can be
The Government of India and the future of the Indian armed forces…    17
16 The letter is not in the file.
17 Ibid., copy of a letter from Wavell to Linlithgow, undated.
18 The viceroy referred here to General Wavell as Commander-in-Chief
of the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDACOM).
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implemented, and any scheme held together, only by the
continued and effective presence of Great Britain. I should be
very surprised if the post-war Cabinet was prepared to play the
altruist either in India or elsewhere in the Empire and to accept
kicks without being regarded as eligible for any of the
compensations; and here, as in the colonial field (and the same is
even more true of Burma) I think we are entitled to bear in mind
that it is we who have created and developed these great
territories, given them peace and good order and held them
together, and that there are limits to the sacrifices that we can
reasonably expected to make. Burma, India and certain of the
colonies which are the products of British rule and British
security must be prepared to pay for them and give certain
guarantees, and I would say again how much I hope that H.M.G.
will not bind themselves any further than they are already bound,
and if and when it comes to a settlement, they will make it clear
that their assistance and support is available on certain terms only
which will be for them to lay down.19
Linlithgow embodied perhaps the most conservative
element of the British colonial ruling class, but the ideas
expressed in this letter reflect a position that, in the following
years, would be shared by almost all the representatives of the
British Raj, both civilians and military officials. The intensity of
their attachment to the empire may have differed in grade, but
almost all were reluctant to lose India.
Amery agreed with Wavell, but he doubted if India’s
existing financial, industrial, and human resources would be
sufficient to satisfy its defence requirements. Amery foresaw
India would continue “to rely on provisions” from the United
Kingdom for some time and the permanence of “the British
18    The Government of India and the future of the Indian armed forces…
19 IOR L/WS/1/1340, Extract from private letter from Lord Linlithgow
to Mr. Amery dated 26 January, 1943.
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element” in the Indian armed forces would be required. Amery
suggested that a ten or fifteen year treaty should be negotiated
with India. He did not go into the details of such a treaty, but
apparently he had in mind a cooperation treaty allowing India’s
defence to become gradually self-dependent. According to
Amery, the treaty could be followed by “a more limited treaty if
necessary to cover deficiencies still existing at the time of the
termination of the first treaty”. He hoped that the Constitution
would not change after the end of the war and disagreed with
Wavell regarding any link between the future of the Indian army
and Indian politics.20
While the India Office, the viceroy, and part of the high
ranks of the army were discussing the post-war defence of India,
in early April 1943 the Joint Planning Staff of the India
Command, following the instructions of the chiefs of staff, issued
a report “based on a full appreciation of India’s strategic problem
after the war”.21 The report suggested that, “for security reasons”
its content should be discussed with “as few officers as possible”.
It was assumed that as soon as possible, after the end of the
war, a special committee should be set up to examine all strategic
aspects concerning India and to reorganise India’s defence.
Although the Joint Planning Staff was instructed not to take into
account strictly political issues, like the form of government India
should adopt after the war, the study focused on two main issues
with strong political implications:
The Government of India and the future of the Indian armed forces…    19
20 Ibid., Extract form private letter from Mr. Amery to Lord Linlithgow,
dated 8 February, 1943.
21 IOR L/WS/1/1341, India Command, Report by the Joint Planning
Staff. Appreciation of future position, J.P.S. Paper No. 57, 3 April 1943,
signed J.G. Hewitt Captain, R.N., G.B. Still Brigadier, L. Darvall Air
Commodore.
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a) Imperial defence as a whole.
b) Current Indian political problems, and probable developments
in this sphere.22
The military staff took for granted that, after the war,
a) India would still be connected with Great Britain, either as a
Dominion or by a treaty guaranteeing assistance in war and
reserving certain rights in return.
b) India would be responsible for maintaining land and air forces
sufficient to defend herself against any minor power; or, if she is
attacked by a first class power, to defend herself until the arrival
of Imperial reinforcements.23
World War II had introduced impressive progress in the
development of weapons, especially air weapons. The Joint
Planning Staff compared the present situation with that described
by the Report of the Expert Committee on the Defence of India
1938-39, known also as the Chatfield Report,24 which studied the
weapons technical progress between the two wars. Also, the
planning staff stressed the connection between defence and
politics: “the development of air power has affected all India’s
defence problems, and must influence profoundly India’s whole
policy for defence in the post war years”.25
“One of the most important considerations”, according the
Joint Planning Staff, was the location of the Imperial Reserve.
The Joint Planning Staff agreed with the Chatfield report that the
20   The Government of India and the future of the Indian armed forces…
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Then a retired Admiral of the Fleet, in 1939 Lord Ernle Chatfield
was appointed Minister for Coordination of Defence.
25 L/WS/1/1341, Report by the Joint Planning Staff.
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Imperial Reserve should be located in India. The Joint Planning
Staff then examined all possible threats to India’s defence.
In early 1943, the British aimed at maintaining a permanent
connection between India and Great Britain and to perpetuate the
colonial model after the end of the war. The 1943 report assumed
the countries then occupied by Japanese forces would return to
the position they were before the war.26 However, as discussed
further in the present essay, in the following years the British
became increasingly concerned about internal political
developments in India and the position it would adopt at the
international level. Doubts also grew about possible changes in
India’s relations with Great Britain, on one side, and the Soviet
Union on the other. Above all, the main question was if India
would remain in the Commonwealth.
According to British military authorities, the main danger
for India’s security in early 1943 was the “aggression by a Major
Land Power”, where “The only great power which could threaten
India’s security is Russia”. According to the British military
experts, a possible Soviet attack on India “is likely to include
airborne forces and operations by submarines and aircraft against
Indian ports and shipping”.27
The British military staff was planning how to improve the
deployment of land and air forces, weapons, and airborne troops
to defend India from a similar attack. The two most vulnerable
areas, according to the British Command, were the North West
and the North East frontiers. The North West Frontier was an area
of permanent crisis, due to the perpetual unrest of the Waziri
tribes. It was particularly exposed to the risk of Russian
infiltration and its defence required the continuous presence of
huge land forces.
The Government of India and the future of the Indian armed forces…    21
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
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While the North West Frontier Province represented an old
and well known problem, the importance of the North East
Frontier had just been revealed by the recent defeats in Burma.
The security of the North East Frontier was therefore strictly
connected with Burma’s defence. This area adjoined the
economically most vital part of India at that time. Therefore,
India cannot disinterest herself from the problem of Burma’s
defence, since, if Burma is occupied by a foreign power, the most
vulnerable and highly industrialized part of India is threatened,
particularly by air attack. We have, therefore, shown the forces
we consider to be necessary for Burma in the conviction that
Burma forms part of the North East Frontier defence problem.28
The Soviet Union was not the only threatening power in this
area (Japan’s and the Axis’ defeat was predictable), as
the only important power likely to threaten Burma is China.
Chinese have however demonstrated their military incapacity
during this war and are unlikely to attempt more than infiltrating
small units into Burma.29
The defence of the North West and North East frontiers
could be secured by land forces and police regiments. However,
the new challenges represented by the production of more
sophisticated weapons and “the speed of modern war” required
a flexibility and mobility that could be provided only by the
development of the airpower. It was therefore of fundamental
importance to maintain and develop the existing airfields,
construct new ones, and control all of them.
22   The Government of India and the future of the Indian armed forces…
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
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In this phase two aspects emerged that, within a few years,
would shape Britain’s foreign and military policy: the relations
with Soviet Russia and the possible partition of India. It is
striking to discover that in 1943, while the Soviet Union was one
of Great Britain’s key allies to fight against the Axis powers,
Britain was already starting to consider the Soviet Union a future
potential enemy.
Summing up, the geopolitical map outlined by the British
military staff in 1943 included two sensitive areas, respectively
northwest and northeast of India, which needed to be protected
by the British or with British assistance. Symptomatically, these
two areas coincided with those that, in the scheme of partition
officially outlined in 1946 and realised in 1947, were to become
the constituent parts of Pakistan.
The post-war world order in South Asia and Middle East
according to the British planners
The relevance of the future of the Indian armed forces for
the protection of British interests was dependant not only on the
defence of India, but because British planners viewed India and
the Middle East as strictly connected. The importance of India
for British strategic and economic interests was determined by
its geopolitical position. British India’s policy was
complementary to British Middle Eastern policy. The role of
India in British policy can be compared with that of Palestine,
whose importance became increasingly clear to British strategists
beginning with World War I. During World War I, Britain needed
to maintain the control of Palestine, because of its proximity to
the entrance of the Suez Canal. Later on, from the end of the
1930s onwards, the economic role of Palestine became
increasingly relevant for British interests. In war times, troops
could be easily transferred from Palestine to Egypt, while
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“reinforcements from India would have to be sent overland from
Iraq through Palestine to Egypt”.30 The refinery and the port of
Haifa had been developed by the British. The Haifa-Kirkuk oil
pipeline had a vital importance for the British military supplies
during World War II. Palestine was also a crucial stopover for air
communications between the Mediterranean and the Far East.
The war itself showed how important this area could be for
British interests, even in post-war times. It was therefore
necessary to maintain military bases and airfields in Palestine,
for the defence of such interests, especially after the end of the
war.31
India was in a similar position. In 1942, the newly created
Military Sub-Committee (MSC), a sub-committee of the chiefs
of staff, on request of the Foreign Office, prepared a
memorandum to study British “post war strategic requirements
in the Middle East”.32 The main subject was Britain’s strategic
requirements “world-wide” and in “areas adjacent to the Middle
East, particularly the Mediterranean Basin as a whole”. The
evaluation of the post-war world situation was based on the
assumption the United States and the British Commonwealth
would remain in close cooperation and Turkey would be a
“strong and friendly” state.
Obviously, the Middle East was an area of vital importance
for British oil supplies and, at the same time, it was also “a base
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from which” Britain could “exercise pressure in the event of
threats or developments hostile to Anglo-American interests”.
Communications had a crucial importance in protecting the area
and the connected interests. Sea, land, and air communications
in the Middle East should therefore “be developed after the war”.
The availability of airbases suitable for all types of military and
civil aircraft was essential.33 Land forces were required to protect
air bases. The British planners aimed at building up a network of
air and land bases, stretching from the Mediterranean to the Far
East, through the Suez Canal and India:
The Mediterranean route to Egypt, India and the Far East is a
strategic link of great importance in the overseas communications
of the British Commonwealth.34
Moreover, according to the British strategists, Britain should
have the right to station forces and to maintain and develop bases
in EGYPT as necessary to its defence, and to move
reinforcements to and through EGYPT.35
Other cornerstones of the system were the Cape route, the
Nile Valley, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, as well as
communications between the Persian Gulf and Russia. However,
the focal points of British defence in the Middle East were the
communications between Egypt, “the Levant”, Iraq, Persia, and
“across Persia to Baluchistan”. These connections were required
“as alternatives to long-sea routes through the Indian Ocean”.
The Kantara/el Qantara-Haifa-Aleppo-Mosul railway and the
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Haifa-Baghdad road should be protected, as well as air bases for
civil air routes and sea communications between Egypt and
Palestine. “In the event of a threat” to Britain’s interests, the
British strategists claimed the right
to move forces to and through PALESTINE and
TRANSJORDAN and through the LEBANON, SYRIA, IRAQ
and along the ALEPPO-NISIBIN-MOSUL railway [and to] use
Haifa as a naval base.36
Thanks to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, Britain would
retain her existing bases in Iraq and could develop additional ones
if necessary. The treaty had a duration of twenty years. Apart
from mutual military assistance, it obliged Iraq to grant to Great
Britain sites for air bases near Basra and the west of the
Euphrates. The United Kingdom, on her part, should provide the
kingdom of Iraq with “arms, ammunition, equipment, ships and
aircrafts of the latest available pattern”.37 The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty
is particularly meaningful because it represented the model the
British military authorities suggested to tie India to the United
Kingdom after independence, in case India would not opt to join
the Commonwealth.
India was part of the picture, because it could play a
fundamental role in protecting British interests in Persia, if the
Persian government developed anti-British feelings or if it broke
down. In this case
Precautionary measures might include: the holding ready of air-
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Marzia CASOLARI
born troops in BALUCHISTAN or the threat to bomb military
objectives in PERSIA, assuming we have the right to maintain
troops in INDIA.38
In 1944, the British military experts concentrated on India’s
role in the defence of the Iranian and Middle Eastern oilfields:
The defence of India is complementary in our strategy to the
defence of EGYPT and the Middle East. In this war we have
managed to held both; and, although the loss of one would not
necessarily entail the loss of the other, the value of one is very
greatly impaired without the other.39
Above all other considerations, India, “by virtue of its
central position, was “well situated for reinforcement to East or
West” was crucially important in the thinking of the British
planners.40
The different views of the British planners on the future
of India’s defence
The India Office and the War Office were studying the
future of India’s defence, simultaneously but separately.
Apparently, the chiefs of staff and the India Office acted without
coordination, with some overlapping and disagreement.
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On 27 April 1943, on instruction of the Directorate of
Military Office (D.M.O.), Lieutenant George William Wren, of
the MI2, wrote a note referring to a meeting with General
Lockhart the previous day.41 Wren mentioned a report he had
given to General Lockhart, where he had outlined the “Egyptian
set-up”.42 In the event that India would become fully independent,
it would be considered, like Egypt, “a foreign country but one
that is essential for the defence of the Commonwealth”.43
Accordingly, India was to be bound to Britain by a treaty. Wren
noted that Lockhart did not appreciate the parallel between Egypt
and India, which he considered “very dangerous”.44
Subsequently, Lockhart clarified his views and admitted, as far
as a possible treaty was concerned, the parallel between Egypt
and India was “very obvious”, but it involved the political and
not the military side of the problem. Moreover, the set-up of the
Indian army was not comparable with the set-up of the Egyptian
army. Wren knew the India Office was exchanging views with
the War Office and the army about the set-up of India’s defence
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after the end of the war and knew Lockhart had received the
report of the Joint Planning Staff.45 According to Wren, “the
terms of reference of this paper are too narrow for our purpose
here, since the size only of the army is considered”. Referring to
his conversation with Lockhart, Wren stated
the future organization of the Army in INDIA must depend on
the future political organization of INDIA, and in the Far East
generally. Until that political organization takes shape, we shall
be able to make little headway with the military set-up. For
instance:
(a) Is INDIA to be a loose federation of semi-autonomous states
(PAKISTAN), or will it coalesce into one unit. If the latter, the
Indian Army might retain it’s present general outline (sic). But if
the former, will PUNJAB soldiers be acceptable in MADRAS,
or will some form of provincial forces become necessary.
(b) Will the defence of INDIA remain a solely British
responsibility, or will it devolve on some international or regional
body, thereby enabling us (perhaps?) to give our eastern defence
forces a different and more acceptable “cover” than “British
Imperialism”.46
Regarding possible political developments in India, Wren
concluded
(c) At present Indian political thinking is still colored the more
extravagantly liberal ideas (sic) of the past 25 years. INDIA and
many of her friends have yet to learn that freedom is not licence.
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A reaction in the right direction is apparent in the rest of the
world, and may spread to INDIA. If it does, we may find our job
of organizing suitable defence forces a good deal easier than it
would be today.47
According to Wren’s report, the D.M.O. believed “whatever
constitutional changes took place in India that country would
remain of vital importance from the point of view of Imperial
strategy”.48 A treaty should regulate the permanence of some
British troops in India, provided the country “would not be able
to defend herself for a long time to come” and its defence should
be secured.49
The India Office and the War Office had almost opposite
views regarding the future of the Indian army. The dominant
opinion within the India Office was that the modernisation of the
army and the reform of India’s defence after the war should
depend on the constitutional and political developments in India.
The decision to carry out any reform or enact any change, directly
or indirectly involving India’s defence, was conditioned by the
future government of India and its attitude towards Great Britain
and the Commonwealth. On the contrary, the C.-in-C. of the
Indian army, Sir Claude Auchinleck, pragmatically believed that
The proper way to handle the problem is surely the way it is being
done here – i.e. first assess the requirements in the immediate
postwar period, bearing in mind potential dangers in the future
and then create a machine to turn this into practical plans, always
with an eye on possible future developments, and guided by
policy regarding the sort of defence forces which we should wish
30                                                    The different views of the British planners…
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., Future of the Indian Army.
Marzia CASOLARI
to create for the new Govt. of India – whatever it may prove to
be.50
General Auchinleck believed it was inconvenient to deal
simultaneously with the problems arising from the immediate
post-war situation and “the steps to be taken during a political
transition period of unknown length”.51 According to him, the
British “task” was
to create the best possible defence organisation which India can
afford and thus to provide for whatever Govt. takes control in
India, the means of maintaining its authority. The defence forces
must therefore be kept as efficient as possible.52
General Auchinleck considered it “dangerous” to reorganise
the Indian army along provincial and communal lines. He did not
mention the reasons, but supposedly he feared a similar
arrangement could affect the unity of the army. Auchinleck
foreshadowed the outbreak of a “next world war” that would
expose India to the enemies’ greed and had no doubts that India
would become a member of the Commonwealth, when
independent.53
The analysis on the defence of India in the post-war period
became increasingly more detailed throughout 1944. After the
end of the war, an international defence system based on
“Regional Zones of Defence” should be created, “within a
general system of world security”. Accordingly,
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(a) A South and South West Pacific Zone has been suggested,
without defining areas. It is reasonable to suggest that other zones
might be (i) the Mediterranean and Middle East (ii) India (iii)
Central and North Pacific (iv) China (v) South Africa – perhaps
others.
(b) The Indian Zone should presumably link with the
Mediterranean – Middle East zone to the West, the South and
South West Pacific Zone to the East, to any Zone in China to the
North East and possibly to any South African zone.54
More specifically,
(d) The zone in which India is clearly interested, leaving aside
what she may ultimately be allotted, is:
EAST Burma
The Bay of Bengal
Malaya
Sumatra
SOUTH Ceylon
Possibly certain Indian Ocean bases
WEST The Persian Gulf and Trucial Sheikhdoms
NORTH WEST The Basra Vilayet
Southern and Eastern Iran
Afghanistan
(Note: Southern Arabia, Aden and the Red Sea interest her
indirectly).
NORTH Sinkiang
Thibet (sic)55
This picture, describing India as the keystone connecting
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East and West was outlined in 1944 and was further developed
in 1945 and in the following years.
The British planners’ conclusions on the future of India’s
defence
Eventually, in summer 1944 the chiefs of staff succeeded in
delivering a sixty-eight page survey, made of several lengthy
appendices and reports. The importance of the document is
highlighted by the fact that it was printed.56
It can be summarised as follows:
a) No constitutional change would take place in India after the
end of the war;
b) Burma would remain independent from India;
c) The situation of internal security in India and in the NWFP
would not radically change;
d) India would be responsible “for maintaining land and air forces
sufficient to defend herself against a minor Power, and against a
major Power until such time as Imperial reinforcements can
arrive”;
e) India would be also responsible for maintaining an external
defence force, according to the principles expressed by the
Chatfield report of 1939;
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f) Japan would be “evicted” from China and South-East Asia and
would not represent a threat to the security of India;
g) “Russia” would remain “in friendly relations with Great Britain
and the United States” and would be “unlikely to threaten India
except by subversive means”;
h) China would “have accumulated sufficient equipment from the
United States to maintain a considerable regular force”.57
It is well known that most of the above-mentioned
assertions did not correspond with the facts and General
Auchinleck was aware of it. He did not agree with the
observations contained in the report C.O.S. (44) 636, included in
the file, which he considered “written purely from the Service
point of view” and its “proposals” could not “be regarded as final
recommendations”. The report was based on theoretical
assumption and on an ideal view of the situation in South Asia.
He and the British military and political authorities were far from
certain about at least two of those assertions: India’s
constitutional settlement in the post-war period and USSR’s
supposed interests in South Asia and in the Middle East and its
possible attempts to expand to these areas. Any further action of
the British authorities was based on these two concerns.
Therefore, General Auchinleck suggested:
Firstly, it is important that a basis should be established as soon
as possible on which planning for the post-war defence forces in
India can proceed, and which can serve as a guide for
preparations for demobilization.58
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The survey examined all possible aspects concerning the
defence of India, the size and composition of Indian forces, the
reform of land, air, and sea forces and the integration between
them, the organisation of regiments, divisions and garrisons,
estimates regarding internal security, and external defence,
training of troops and officers. The record reflected a rising
suspicion among British authorities that, besides China and
Russia, the United States also was cultivating its own interests
in India.
Once more the importance of the air power was emphasised
and it was recommended “that the enemy’s air forces are kept at
a reasonable distance from our territory and our bases”.59
Apparently, India was considered British territory.
In India were placed what the British considered their bases:
1. We shall require to use India as a main support area in order to
avail ourselves of her manpower resources and growing
industries capacity.
2. Airfields in India are essential for the maintenance of our
communications to the Far East.
3. Bases in India are important to our command of the Indian
Ocean.
4. The continuance of India’s cooperation with the Common -
wealth in defence is essential.60
To fulfil these requirements, India’s armed forces should be
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“modern, efficient, capable of expansion in war, and under
unified control”.61
It was expected India would provide “the greater part of
garrisons” for Burma. Malaya, and Siam and, in general, for the
South-East Asia command.62 Afghanistan should be protected
against a probable Soviet expansion. This event should be
avoided by political measures, but especially by strengthening
India’s defensive capacity.63
The crucial question was where to locate the Imperial
Reserve. The ideal place was obviously India, because it was
strategically and administratively a suitable place in which to
locate an Imperial reserve but, in view of possible political
developments the feasibility of developing Baluchistan to meet
the requirements of such a reserve should be examined.64
This option was to be carefully examined, should it be
necessary, in future, to locate the Imperial Reserve “elsewhere
than in India proper”.65 This does not just mean the British
military did not consider Baluchistan as a part of India, but rather
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they believed it was possible to easily detach a part of Indian
territory.
The report considered also the size of the forces to be
allotted to face internal troubles in particularly sensitive areas,
as well as possible external threats, the transport and type of
armaments to be employed. The external dangers affecting the
North West and North East Frontiers were represented by a
possible attack on India by a “major Power”. Internal troubles
meant essentially unrest among the North West Frontier Province
(NWFP) tribal people or possible threats to India along the
Durand Line (dividing British India from Afghanistan).
As far as the North East Frontier was concerned, the British
military experts estimated that no special allotment of troops was
required, apart from those already on the field, as no danger of
external attack in that area was expected, but only a possible
general unrest in Burma, after the end of the war. In all cases, the
employment of air arms and the role of airfields were crucial.66
Regarding external threats on India, the only major power
to be in a position to seriously threaten India after the war, it was
repeated, was Russia. The British officers expected that the
Soviet Union could launch an attack on India from its airfields
in Turkestan. The most vulnerable areas were considered to be
Punjab, the NWFP, and Baluchistan. They should therefore be
reinforced with “an adequate number of fighter aircraft”.
Afghanistan could be at the same time a direct target of a Soviet
attack or an intermediate step of an advance to India. Quetta and
Karachi were the keystones of the British defence against a
possible Soviet invasion. Moreover, independently from a
possible Soviet menace, Karachi was the most important supply
base for any military operation in the region.67
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In a possible future war involving India, the air force would
play a crucial role and could have several functions: internal
security, control of the North West and North East Frontier tribal
areas, defence of these border areas against a minor aggression,
and support to Afghanistan “against pressure or intimidation by
a neighbouring Power”.68
To sum up, Baluchistan was at the same time a possible
target of a Soviet invasion and the most suitable base of the
British defence of India. Air forces were considered fundamental
in the defence of India in a possible future war against Russia.
India as a whole was considered the “base” of British military
organisation in Asia. Two of the main centers of the British
defence system in South Asia, Baluchistan and the port of
Karachi, were placed in areas that could be detached from India,
once it became independent. The British military experts
intended to build up a “skeleton air force … as a foundation upon
which substantial air force” might be developed. “General
considerations” pointed “to the Karachi, Quetta and Rawalpindi
areas” as “the most suitable locations for the units comprising
the skeleton Air Force”.69 The skeleton air force “and ground
organization” provided for by the British military authorities had
been conceived to safeguard “the requisite mobility to any
Reserves which may be stationed in India” and therefore it was
expected to be capable to protect as much as possible the air
reinforcement routes.70 This was the ultimate goal of the reform
of the Indian defence. At that time, India was “unable to
contribute air forces” to any external defence units,
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but should rather contribute all the airfields, installations, skeleton
warning system and ground organization necessary to receive the
Imperial reinforcements arriving to defend her country (sic) in
the case of war.71
Where to locate the British troops after World War II?
As the Imperial Reserve in the East required a location in
areas that were “most likely to be required to reinforce” the
British troops, the military experts identified India “proper” and
the “adjacent territories” of Baluchistan and Burma as the most
suitable areas to host the Imperial Reserve.72 Several factors
played in favour and against the choice of each area. The experts
evaluated three cases. The first, India, would be favoured by the
following three aspects:
1. “The presence of this additional force inside the country
would greatly assist the internal security problem in peace”.
2. India possessed “better road and rail communications
than either Burma or Baluchistan”, while its ports could be
considerably developed and were so strategically located to
facilitate the transport of forces along the East-West routes.
3. In India existed many installations developed during the
present war, that enabled the country “to act as a base” for
the transportation of forces overseas.
However, against this choice there were the following
counter indications:
1. The internal situation in India was expected to deteriorate
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after the war. If serious problems arose, “its communi -
cations and installations” might be “endangered” and the
readiness of forces would be damaged.
2. In case India requested the Dominion Status, it was
“questionable whether she would agree to an Imperial Force
being located in the country”.73
The memory was still vivid of the attitude Indian political
leaders adopted in 1942, when they denied the use of Indian
territory as a base for the war operations. Also, the British had
not forgotten the Quit India movement. That experience
influenced British military and political choices concerning India
in the following years.
Four elements were in favour of Burma as the location of
the Imperial Reserve:
1. The Imperial Reserve would be an addition to the existing
garrison until the country could raise its own force.
2. The Imperial Reserve would act as a deterrent against
China’s attempts “to infiltrate into or invade parts of
Burma”.
3. Similarly, the Imperial reserve in Burma would be “a
deterrent to any Chinese advance into Tibet”.
4. The Imperial Reserve in Burma would be “suitably
located for operations in the Far East”.
Against this option, there were the following factors:
1. The internal road and rail communications were poor and
Rangoon, the only main port, had several intrinsic defects
and could be improved to a great extent.
2. The internal situation in Burma was mostly unsettled and
could adversely affect the preparation of the force.
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3. “The climate of the greater part of Burma is unsuitable
for European troops”.
Finally, as far as Baluchistan was concerned,
1. It was “relatively easy to exclude Baluchistan” from the
remainder of India once India was given Dominion Status.
2. A force located here could meet aggressions by “Russia”
or Afghanistan.
3. Baluchistan would be “well situated to reinforce the
protection” of British interests in Iraq and Persia.
4. The Imperial Reserve in Baluchistan “would act as a
deterrent to further Russian penetration in Persia”.
However:
1. Baluchistan had no ports, “unless Karachi and the
communications to it are placed under Imperial control” and
Gwadar would be developed.
2. These ports were exposed to “heavy enemy bombing” in
case of war.
3. The road and rail communications of Baluchistan
required development.
4. The region was arid and underdeveloped.74
Excluding Baluchistan from India meant detaching it from
the rest of the country, to better militarily control its territory.
Drawing the conclusions, the report stated that Burma was not a
suitable location for the Imperial Reserve, while the possibility
to use Baluchistan for the purpose required further investigations.
After all, India remained the best option, for the moment.
However, the choice of India as the location of the Imperial
reserve was subordinated to a future political settlement of India
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favourable to British interests. Accordingly, not only was the
military approach to the problem examined, the political
implications of the use of India as a military base were examined:
The question of the use of India as a base for Imperial forces is
one of the main questions that will have to be dealt with in the
constitutional settlement, and from this point of view there might
be something to be said for Baluchistan. You will remember that
in a recent memorandum Sir Olaf Caroe discussed this question,
and made the suggestion of Kashmir or somewhere else on the
outer ring of India (as opposed to British India) in order to get
round Indian political objection.75
Olaf Caroe (1892-1981) was the last foreign secretary for
India, from 1939 to 1945. He had been governor of the North
West Frontier Province between 1946 and 1947, across the
partition. Due to his positions, exceedingly in favour of the
Muslim League, Caroe encountered the opposition of the Indian
government and was replaced by Robert Lockhart. After his
retirement in 1947, Caroe wrote extensively about the great game
and Britain’s oil policy.76 Caroe might have inspired most of the
above-mentioned analysis concerning the strategic role of India
in the defence of Britain’s oil interests. After publishing his Wells
of Power, Caroe was noticed by the American authorities, who
invited him to Washington in 1952, where he met US Secretary
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of State John Foster Dulles and Henry Byroade, then assistant
secretary of state for the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. It
is believed Olaf Caroe was in favour of India’s partition and he
might have inspired US’s pro-Pakistan policy.77
The British doubts on the political feasibility of their post-
World War II military projects for South Asia
The language of an India Office note of April 1944
highlights that, although the British had the intention to use India
as a military base to protect their interests in South and South-
East Asia, but they doubted that the post-war constitutional
settlement would allow them to pursue this goal. The English
officers in general but, in particular, Auchinleck and Wavell were
convinced that India would become independent sometime after
the war. But the British did not trust the Indian leadership, which
was essentially the Congress leadership. They remembered the
experience of the Cripps mission. That mission failed, especially
because of the impossibility to find an accord on defence
responsibilities, and because Indian leaders claimed it when the
British rulers were not ready to transfer.78
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The British had considered the attitude of the Congress
under Gandhi’s influence as mere non-cooperation to the war
effort. The Mahatma’s position, partially mitigated by Nehru’s
mediation, was one of absolute opposition to the use of Indian
soil for military operations and stationing of American and
Chinese troops. Gandhi expressed unequivocally his views in a
famous article published in Harijan on 26 April 1942:
Now we have promise of a never-ending stream of soldiers from
America and possibly from China. I must confess that I do not
look upon this event with equanimity. Cannot a limitless number
of soldiers be trained out of India’s millions? … We know what
American aid means. It amounts in the end to American
influence, if not American rule added to British. It is a tremendous
price to pay for the possible success of allied arms.79
The British feared the Indian leadership might adopt a
similar attitude after the war. Americans too must have
remembered the position of the Congress regarding the US policy
in India when, after the end of World War II, they became
suspicious about Nehru’s non-alignment and opted for Pakistan
as its most reliable ally in Asia.80
In mid the 1940s, the British rulers knew very well the
orientation of the Congress leadership, especially of Nehru, who
embodied the “more extravagantly liberal ideas of the past 25
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years”, to use Lieut. Col. Wren’s words.81 The British suspected
India would develop an independent foreign policy, far from the
British sphere; hence, the necessity to create a British base in
Baluchistan or in other areas in the “outer ring” of the Indian
territory. This meant setting up military infrastructures, in
particular airfields, in areas that could be easily detached from
India in case it would opt not to join the Commonwealth once it
received independence.
Baluchistan, but possibly also other areas, west and east
from India, could be suitable. The neighbourhoods of India, the
fringes of its continental block, far from the capital and from the
core of the country, could be separated without provoking a major
mutilation. It is interesting (and striking) to learn that in Caroe’s
plans Kashmir was included in the outer belt, which could be
detached from India. The Kashmir issue is one of the most
debated in India’s contemporary history. Nevertheless, due also
to the availability of the records (many are still sealed), the
feeling of the historian is that it is still not completely
investigated.
Finally, according to the External Department of the India
Office, Indian politicians should be “got around”. In other words,
it was easier, according to the British rulers, to deceive the Indian
leaders and public opinion by severing a part of India’s territories
before India’s independence, rather than facing constitutional
quibbles and political opposition afterwards.
Detaching a part of India to make a military base
It is interesting to notice that Amery, to justify the necessity
to modernise the Indian army, in the already-mentioned letter to
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General Wavell of January 1943 asserted “India has been
discussed so much as the venue of all sorts of daring political
experiments”.82 What did Amery mean with this sentence?
Amery’s letter did not refer to any strategic or geopolitical issue,
but concentrated on strictly military aspects. However, from 1944
the British authorities examined with increasing attention the idea
of detaching a part of India, especially of north western India, to
better control the region, without being paralysed by the Indian
leadership.
The connection between the right of any province to secede
from the Indian Union (in other terms, the Pakistan option),
established by the 1942 draft declaration, and Britain’s defence
requirements in the Indian subcontinent is clearly expressed in a
letter from Richard G. Casey, governor of Bengal, to Lord
Wavell, dated 6 November 1944. Apart from defining the draft
declaration “a generous proposal”, the Governor described the
outcome of the constitutional process which should bring to “‘the
realization of self-government in India’ as an Indian Union in
common allegiance to the Crown as a Dominion”.
On the other side, Casey underlined “the right of any
Province or Provinces to contract out and so become, if desired,
another Indian ‘Union’, with the same status as the principal
‘Indian Union’ and with its own Constitution and with the same
relationship to the Crown”.83 Quoting the draft declaration, Casey
suggested that the Constitution-making body (or bodies in case
of more than one Dominion) would negotiate separate treaties
“covering ‘all necessary matters arising out of the complete
transfer of responsibility” from the British authorities to the
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Indian independent government. The treaty could be contracted
out of the British Commonwealth. Casey did not specify it, but
it is clear, when the declaration was drafted, it had been taken for
granted that one or more Unions would not adhere to the British
Commonwealth. As it will be better described further on in this
essay, the British were very doubtful whether India would join
the Commonwealth. Interestingly, Casey considered the Cripps
Declaration as “still ‘open’” and described it as the basis for the
settlement of the Indian Union and the basis along which
eventually divide the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan.
This is a proof that the possibility to divide India was already an
embryo in British intentions in 1942 and, consequently, in the
Cripps Declaration. There is a continuity between the Cripps
Declaration, the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946, and the partition
announcement of 3 June 1947. The “right of the British Provinces
to walk out was a consistent feature”, in Britain’s approach to
India’s independence.84
The British did not conceive the provincial option just to
meet the requests of the Indian Muslims, but rather to preserve
their strategic interests in the region. Even if Casey thought that
Pakistan was “nonsense” and expected Pakistan and India to
reunite after a few years, he asserted:
After all, our major interest is to have an India that is as friendly
as possible towards us in the post-war world.85 We do not want
in particular to antagonise the Muslims because -
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(a) they have been our friends and supporters for a great many
years;
(b) the potential NW and NE Pakistans lie across the track of our
major imperial line of communication; and
(c) we do not want to antagonize their Muslim cousins in the
Middle East, who also lie across our imperial communications
by sea and air.86
On the other side, Casey was convinced “the great majority
of educated Indians dislike us and want us out”. Casey did not
include the Muslims in this category: such hostility was “the
result of nearly a generation of intensive propaganda, principally
by the Congress”.87 Like other British statesmen in 1942, Casey
hoped the United States would aid British officials in promoting
the draft declaration and to carry out “some strong-arm publicity
on the Indian problem” to
combat the distorted presentation of the India problem in the
mouths of professional anti-British agitators in America and stop
this propaganda from becoming a means of driving a wedge
between Britain and the United States.88
In his reply to Casey’s letter, Wavell agreed only partially
with the governor’s views. In particular, Wavell was sceptical
about a “mere restatement” of the Cripps Declaration, because
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he believed that the Muslims’ idea of Pakistan had “crystallised”
since 1942.89 Wavell did not add much, but most probably he
wanted to mean that the Muslim might demand more concrete
steps for the foundation of Pakistan compared to the vague
principles enunciated by the Cripps offer.
The correspondence exchanged by Casey and Wavell
between the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 sheds light
on the off-stage work preceding independence and partition.
Casey was very sceptical about what he defined the “Pakistan
idea”, which had grown, according to him, because of the
Congress’ approach to the Muslims. The governor of Bengal had
many reservations regarding Pakistan and he shared the views of
an elitist Bengali minority who believed East Pakistan should be
“a sovereign state with a bare Muslim majority of population”,
administered by Muslims and Hindus “in amity”.
On the other side, Casey was doubtful about Pakistan’s
economic feasibility. Wavell was much more pragmatic. He also
did not believe that Pakistan would work and he thought that it
was “economically unsound”. Unlike Casey, Wavell believed that
“the driving force of Pakistan” did not come from the provinces
where the Muslims were in a majority, which had nothing to gain
from the separation, apart from “freedom from the Centre”, and
could easily “dominate the Legislature and the Government”
even within the Indian Union. However, Wavell believed that
Until we have something to offer in place of Pakistan, I do not
think you should risk being represented as openly hostile to it.90
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Apparently, afterwards the British did not find anything to
offer in place of Pakistan. After all, also Wavell thought that
Pakistan is the extreme expression of Muslim suspicions and
fears, which are real and to some extent justified.91
The importance of keeping India united
Summing up, by 1945 the possibility of favouring the
detachment of some territories from India proper to create
politically secure military bases for the British Empire had
already been discussed in some depth by the British. However, a
strong and undivided India still remained Great Britain’s
favourite option. This was the end result of the development that,
during World War II, the British had become increasingly aware
of India’s strategic importance under three aspects. First, they
acknowledged India’s vital importance for the defence of the
British Empire and British strategic and economic interests in
Asia. Second, they acknowledged India’s role in connecting the
Middle East and South East Asia. Third, they considered India
as a “bastion” against the USSR’s expansion south and eastwards.
Already in the early 1940s, the British started to imagine a post-
war world order subordinate to British interests and inspired by
the principle that no power capable of prolonged hostile action
against us should set foot South of the arch formed by the
HIMALAYAS, the HINDU KUSH, the North PERSIAN frontier,
the ELBURZ mountains, and the Northern borders of SYRIA.92
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In 1943, the British developed a policy in India
complementary with Britain’s Middle Eastern policy. Britain’s
“vital strategic requirements in the Middle and Far East” were
(a) the retention of the oilfields in Iraq and Persia
(b) the protection of its communications along the west-east
routes.93
If India came under control of an “unfriendly” power, these
two conditions could not be secured and the sea routes from India
and Ceylon to the Persian Gulf and Iraq oilfields, and from the
Mediterranean to the Far East and Australia, would be
compromised. India was “the keystone of the military security
of the Commonwealth” in the Far East.
The United Kingdom’s task was therefore, after the end of
the war, to maintain in India adequate forces not just for local
defence, but also against all possible external threats, “by land,
sea, and air”. India should realise its own security was not merely
a matter of maintaining internal order and must protect its
borders. It should therefore accept the presence of “considerable”
British forces. According to the British military authorities,
The political future of India is uncertain. It may split into a
number of semi-autonomous states. It may coalesce into one unit.
It may even refuse to remain within the Commonwealth, in which
case it will be like EGYPT, a foreign country but one that is
essential for the defence of the Commonwealth. We must
therefore ensure by negotiations that we retain the responsibility
for the defence of INDIA, and not grant independence without a
thought of safeguarding our own future.
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Accordingly, the following seem to be the main points to be
secured:
a) INDIA must pledge unrestricted aid to BRITAIN in case of
war.
b) INDIA’s aid in war must include unrestricted use of all
facilities, including ports, air-fields, and communications.
c) INDIA must undertake to place her economy at our disposal
in war in order that, as far as possible, our forces in the Far East
may be maintained from India.
d) INDIA must agree to the posting of British forces in certain
selected and vital localities, and that they may be at once available
for the wider defence of India, should such action become
necessary.
The above note has been written to deal with the worst possible
case, from the military point of view, of a united INDIA which
wishes to became fully independent. If full independence is not
desired, our object will be correspondingly easier to attain. The
internal security problem in India will, of course, provide a very
strong reason for the presence of British forces for some time to
come, and therefore may be counted on to aid our case.94
However, since it was hard for the British to justify their
strategic aims only on the basis of Indian internal security, they
should, the document stated, put their “demands to INDIA
frankly and firmly”. It was expected that the policy to be carried
out in India after the end of the war could be similar to the policy
adopted in Egypt in 1936, when the British occupation terminated
with the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of Alliance.95
When the end of the war and independence approaching,
the attention of the British statesmen focused increasingly on
India’s future role in Asia. In Spring 1945, the secretary of state
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required the secretary of the External Affairs Department to
produce a report to be submitted to the recently reconstituted
“interdepartmental Far Eastern Committee set up in London
under the chairmanship of the Foreign Office”, where the India
Office was represented.96 The task of the Far Eastern Committee
was to advise His Majesty’s Government on “the political and
economic policy” regarding the Far East and the “desirability of
close co-operation with the Dominions, the Government of India
and foreign Governments with interests in that region”.97
The report defined India as “the hub of Asiatic policy” and
described its “external interests” as projected
all around the perimeter; on the landward side over all the Middle
East countries where India’s foreign interests have been engaged
for more than a century, over the small countries immediately
surrounding India which have been described as buffer States.
Over the table lands to the north such as Sinkiang and Tibet where
the interests of India have conflicted with those of other Powers,
round the continental countries of South East Asia; on the sea
approaches over the Indian Ocean from Singapore (or perhaps
beyond) to Suez including of course the Persian Gulf.98
India’s foreign policy in Asia appeared as “one connected
picture”99 and the defence of India depended on the defence of
the surrounding areas:
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The question of defence is not within the purview of the
Committee, but it is impossible in reviewing foreign policies to
exclude considerations of defence altogether, as for example
when such subjects as the future of Siam or Indo-China are being
discussed. The foreign policy of India in such matters as the
stability of buffer States, the maintenance of influence in the
Persian Gulf and the drawing of frontiers, has to be seen always
with an eye to security and defence.100
It was expected India would make a rapid political progress
“towards a position of autonomy within the British
Commonwealth of Nations”. However,
It is not clear how far India may be regarded as an effective base
for the maintenance of security in the post-war world or who its
allies and associates will be.101
The experts feared that, at the end of the war, India would
ally with the USSR or that it would side against the British
interests in South Asia:
Although the assumption is that India will remain within the
British Commonwealth even so in future its policies and interest
may be expected to diverge from those of Great Britain.102
Nevertheless, in 1945 the British planners were still
optimistic India would join the Commonwealth and they aimed
for India to become a leading country in Asia,
even more important than China if it built on foundations already
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laid and was prepared to co-operate freely and fully with the
Commonwealth as a whole. The vision should be one of a future
for India as a great Power in Asia – a vision which may do more
than anything else to turn Indian politics away from sterile
introversions and to hold the country together against separatist
tendencies within. This way lies the most solid hope of
maintaining a belief in the wisdom and usefulness of the British
connection.103
After celebrating the pax Britannica in Asia, which granted
India stability, and after praising the British commitment to the
modernisation of India’s infrastructures and economy, the paper
examined the Asian developments at the end of World War II.
Japan, emerged as a world power after World War I, had been
defeated but it would remain as major power, while “the
revolution in China and the beginning of its transformation into
what may make it tomorrow as powerful as Japan at its height”104
represented a new challenge, as well as the “new inventions” in
warfare technology, which shortened the distance between the
USSR and India.
The External Affairs Department had an intricate vision of
India’s future foreign policy and its position in the region. The
External Affairs Department overestimated the post-war role and
influence of the Soviet Union in Persia and Afghanistan and
assumed British goals would be coincidental with Indian
objectives. Accordingly, the report foresaw a system of
“interstices of petty tribal territories or friendly and, for the most
part minor, buffer states” between India and the external world.
Such system was described as the result of British policy and
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involved territories and states from Persia and Afghanistan to
“Siam” and Malaya, including Kalat,105 Kashmir and Sikkim,
Tibet, Nepal, Burma and Ceylon. In the past, these territories had
represented the “glacis” of India’s defence but, after World War
II, the balances had changed and the relations of India with the
surrounding areas had to change accordingly.106
The report focused on three main issues: strategic
requirements, the protection of communications, and the oil
supply. India’s military security was the central objective and it
required that “Persia and Iraq should be neutralized”. The report
repeated some concepts already expressed by the military staff
in 1943-44 regarding the importance of “Persia and the adjacent
Arab lands”, where the entire Gulf region acted “as a kind of
magnet to Asiatic air routes”. Therefore, for the protection of the
land and air routes between the Middle East and India, “friendly
governments in Persia, in the Gulf, and in Iraq” were required.107
At the same time, these lands were
India’s principal source of oil, the power house on which its
industrialization and modernization will largely depend. Neither
Burma nor any other Asiatic producer (including the N.E.I.) is
likely to have an importance at all comparable, at least on the
basis of present knowledge of oil deposits.108
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The analysis contained in this booklet described a very
ambitious policy that put India at the centre of intricate
connections, involving the Arab countries, South East Asia, and
also the US. According to the External Affairs Department, the
“Sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf” were in effect protectorates in
special treaty relations with the British Government, which is
responsible for their defence and the conduct of their foreign
relations.
The presence of the United States and France was increasing
in this region, where India had remarkable economic interests,
as proved by the great number of Indian merchants living and
dealing there. A balance between these potentially conflicting
interests should be maintained.
India’s need has been served in the past by the maintenance of
the Gulf as a British-controlled lake. But the emergence of the
interests of oil and communications has brought American
influence to this region, and it is to the common interest that
Britain should show a united front with the U.S.A. in securing
the peace of this region on which so much depends.109
The External Affairs Department was concerned about
Iraq’s political influence on India. Iraq promoted the union of
Arab countries and this ideal found “some echo among Muslim
politicians and intellectuals in India”. Moreover, Iraq
voices the Arab dislike of the Jew, and any voice or action from
Baghdad intended to defeat the process of Zionism will find a
ready response in Muslim India. British policy in Palestine must
therefore be directed not only with an eye on the Arab world but
a degree of deference to Indian sentiments also.110
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The Indian subcontinent was therefore associated to the
Middle East not only from the strategic but also from the political
point of view.
The booklet contained several observations reflecting
British conceptions of foreign policy in Asia, rather than
objective views on India’s role in Asia and its foreign policy. The
British took for granted that Britain’s and India’s views and
requirements were coincident. The entire scope of the report was
to suggest possible solutions to prevent the USSR’s advance to
India, from any side, at the cost of pointing at odd, even
unscrupulous outcomes. China’s authority on Sinkiang, for
instance, was described as a safeguard for India against Russia’s
advance. To reach this objective, it was necessary
to maintain the integrity of Chinese rule in this region. An
incidental result of the continuance of Chinese authority in
Sinkiang should be the permanent denial of Tibet to any possible
extension of Russian influence towards Lhasa from north.111
Sinkiang and Tibet were therefore strictly connected. The
External Affairs Department was ready to sacrifice Tibet to
safeguard India:
His Majesty’s Government and the Government of India are
prepared to recognize China as the suzerain of Tibet; but in view
of the evident wishes of the Tibetan people, past history, and the
absence of any national uniformity between Tibetans and
Chinese, only in return for Chinese recognition of the Tibetan
claim to autonomous status.112
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When referring to the Government of India, it is not clear if
the British officer who drew up the report referred to British
Government in India or to the future Indian government. In the
second case, even if the reaction of the government of
independent India after the Chinese invasion of Tibet was
comparatively soft, it does not mean that India fully recognised
China’s step. India’s reaction to China’s invasion of Tibet was
probably dictated more by real politik than by any other
consideration. It was also naïve to believe China would recognise
Tibet as an autonomous region in the proper sense. Interestingly,
China was considered less threatening than the Soviet Union.
Nepal was described as an Indian realm,113 probably also in
the attempt to counterbalance China’s authority over Tibet and
to contain the possible extension of China’s authority over Nepal
as well.
It is interesting to notice that Burma’s importance to India
was more military than economic:
Burma commands the Bay of Bengal and its occupation by a
foreign power is no less perilous to India than would be that of
Afghanistan.114
“Indo-China” and “Siam” were also considered buffer
states, vital for India’s defence.115 To preserve a similar order,
India needed some allies. With “a defence problem of such
complexity, India cannot expect, in the first years of its autonomy,
to achieve its objects without the aid of allies”.116 The only
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possible ally was obviously Great Britain,117 and the Common -
wealth offered the framework:
In the past century this has been secured by the British Navy in
union with the man-power and resources of India; and a common
system united all South Asia from Suez to Singapore. With the
transformation of the British Commonwealth a new organization
and a new system is required; and India may not unjustly aspire
to a leading role in this political construction, being the base from
which tranquility must radiate over southern Asia. But, before
India is committed to any international security grouping, it is
necessary to consider how far an inter-Commonwealth defence
organization can provide for any regional arrangement. Some
form of regional organization may prove to be an essential of the
modern world, and India’s legitimate interest is to ensure that its
demarcation is favorable.118
However, “an Indian Ocean security or economic region is
unlikely to evolve of itself; it will need the backing of the
Commonwealth”.119
Most of the assumptions contained in this booklet reflected
Britain’s needs rather than India’s requirements. The British
expected the safeguard of India’s interests in Asia would allow
the continuation of Britain’s influence on the region, even if India
became independent.
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Thinking out a possible partition: The Mody-Matthai
memorandum
Immediately after the end of World War II, the British
authorities began to prepare the transfer of powers and to
familiarise with the idea of Pakistan. In September 1945, Sir
Homi Mody120 and John Matthai121 released “A Memorandum on
the Economic and Financial Aspects of Pakistan”.122 The
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120 Sir Hormasji Peroshaw Mody (1881-1969), better known as Homi
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politician. Among other appointments, Homi Mody was the Chairman
of the Bombay Millowners Association in 1927 and from 1929 to 1934
and Chairman of the Indian Merchants Chamber in 1928. He was
appointed Director of the Tata Group in 1939 and served the company
until 1959. Homi Mody was a member of the Legislative Assembly
from 1929 to 1943 and from 1941 to 1943 a member of the viceroy’s
Executive Council with the Supply Portfolio, Governor of Bombay in
1947 and Governor of Uttar Pradesh from 1949 to 1952. He distanced
himself from the Congress because, as a “constitutionalist”, he did not
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121 John Matthai (1886-1959) was an outstanding economist from
Kerala. He was appointed member of the Tariff Board in 1925 and
subsequently its Chairman. Matthai had several public appointments
as an expert in finance, commerce, and statistics. He was appointed
member of the Finance Committee of the provisional Government in
1946 and, after the independence, he had been the first Finance
Minister of India. Matthai held this position until 1951, when he
returned to Kerala. Subsequently he was appointed Vice Chancellor of
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memorandum had been originally submitted to the Sapru
Committee,123 of which Mody and Matthai were members.
Modi’s and Matthai’s task was to verify the economic
sustainability of Pakistan. In public debates, it was generally
assumed that separation would “weaken the resources of the
country and impair its capacity of defence”124 and jeopardise both
India and Pakistan. The memorandum was largely inspired by
Reginald Coupland’s text The Constitutional Problem in India.125
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123 The Sapru Committee was appointed in November 1944 by the
Standing Committee of the Non-party Conference. The Committee had
the task to examine the communal problem under the judicial and
constitutional point of view, after the breakdown of the Gandhi-Jinnah
talks. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, who chaired the Committee, selected 29
members representing all communities. In its final session, in April
1945, the Committee passed fifteen resolutions were, among other, the
partition of India was strongly opposed, the abolition of separate
electorates was demanded and it was established that no province or
state was entitled to secede. The committee also submitted to Viceroy
Lord Wavell a list of fundamental rights to be included in the future
Constitution.
Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru (1875-1949) was an outstanding lawyer and a
statesman born in Aligarh, from a Kashmiri Brahmin family. Sapru was
a pro-British liberal who received several appointments within the
Indian Government. He had been member of the Governor General
Executive Council and worked at the Round Table Conference in
London. Throughout the constitutional debate, Tej Bahadur played a
moderating role between Muslims and Hindus. In spite of his
opposition to the Congress policy and the Gandhian nonviolent mass
campaigns, he was respected as an eminent jurist by the Congress
politicians.
124 Ibid., Preface.
125 Reginald Coupland, The Constitutional Problem in India, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1945.
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Mody and Matthai took for granted that the zones which
would have merged with Pakistan were Sind, Baluchistan, Punjab
and the NWFP to the west and Assam and Bengal to the east.
However, at the moment of writing the memorandum, it was not
yet clear which method would have been chosen to “demarcate”
the boundaries of Pakistan. Before entering a detailed study of
the economic features of the lands that should form Pakistan, the
memorandum took into consideration three possible ways of
aggregating the territories of the future state:
a. the entire provinces with Muslim majorities would join
Pakistan
b. only “contiguous districts” in each province, rather than entire
provinces, would join Pakistan.
According to the second solution, the “districts with a
predominantly non-Muslim population” would “remain attached
to the rest of India”.126
A third possibility was the “demarcation of Pakistan
according to economic zones”, based on Coupland’s
recommendations to divide India along “natural economic
regions” represented by the basins of the Indus and the Ganges,
the deltaic region, and the Deccan Plateau. This delimitation was
approximately but not totally coincident with the province-wise
demarcation.
Apart from considerations on the revenue-expenditure
relation in the different solutions, the memorandum established
that, under the agricultural point of view, the position of Pakistan
was somehow better than that of India, because the western part
of Pakistan was comparatively more advanced. From the
commercial point of view, in case of district-wise separation,
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Pakistan would suffer from the loss of the port of Calcutta, which
would be hardly compensated by the development of Karachi
and Chittagong.
As far as industrial development was concerned, Pakistan
was less favoured than India, on which it had to rely for the
production of certain consumption goods. Both Pakistan areas
lacked iron and manganese, but they had “great possibilities as
regards the development of hydro-electric power”.127
The “crux of the problem” was defence. The “establishment
of new frontiers between Pakistan and Hindustan” would
increase the expenditure on defence.128 Moreover, “With a
powerful Soviet Russia on the north-west and a new China on
the east”, it was unreasonable to reduce the defence expenditure.
The two zones of Pakistan as an independent state could maintain
the existing standards of public administration and living, but
their revenues would not be sufficient to secure an adequate
defence of the country. An “agreed policy between Pakistan and
the rest of India in the sphere of economic development and
defence”129 was therefore strongly recommended. Interestingly,
Mody and Matthai were looking at rising forms of economic
cooperation in Europe as an example.
Obviously, a united India was preferable to a truncated one.
The only acceptable alternative was the development of a free
trade area between India and Pakistan:
India satisfies the requirements of an optimum unit for economic
development in terms of area, population and resources more than
any other single country in the world except the United States of
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America and Soviet Russia. In spite of her population of 389
million, the density of population in India taken as a whole is
smaller than in most countries of the world. She has enough space
of her own and the variety of climates and soils makes it possible
for her to produce most agricultural commodities in general use.
The mineral resources of the country, though in certain respects
deficient, are on the whole adequate to make her a “powerful and
reasonably self-sufficient industrial nation”. Her population again
constitutes a sufficiently large potential market. These advantages
will be lost if India is divided into separate states without a
common economic policy.130
Partition was still seen as an extreme choice:
From the point of view of defence and of economic development,
with which defence is closely bound under modern conditions, it
is therefore inevitable, if the division of India into separate states
is found necessary for political reasons, that Pakistan and the rest
of India should continue to act in close cooperation in these
essential matters.131
However extreme, this choice was increasingly taken into
consideration by the British rulers. This memorandum influenced
the point of view of the British authorities, as proved by the
subsequent correspondence, which resumed several concepts
developed by Mody and Matthai.
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Thinking out a possible partition: The October 1945
External Affairs Ministry memorandum
In October 1945, the External Affairs Department drew up
a memorandum entitled “The next step in India”.132 With
reference to the election planned for 1946 and the struggle
between the League and the Congress regarding the Muslim
homeland, the memorandum acknowledged the complex
situation in Bengal, Punjab and the NWFP. In these provinces,
the Muslim League was not certain to gain the majority and, even
in case the Muslim League could secede in these areas, its victory
would be based on unstable coalitions. Before setting up the
Constituent Assembly and starting the constitutional debate, it
was necessary to bring “the parties together on some minimum
basis of agreement”. A decision could be taken in advance
regarding Muslims:
So far as the Muslims are concerned, the principle of a Muslim
homeland should be accepted subject to territorial adjustment to
meet the claim of the Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab and of
Hindus in Bengal.133
The memorandum suggested the boundaries of the new
states should be defined by an international commission of
experts, which, however, never materialised.
Regarding the second decision:
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2) It should also be laid down so far as the States are concerned
that the monarchal form of government and the continuation of
existing dynasties will not be open to discussion in the
Constituent Assembly.134
As far as the first decision was concerned, the India Office
asserted it was necessary to secure the Congress acceptance of
the proposal before approaching Jinnah. The British believed the
Congress would not refuse the proposal that was, according to
them, very similar to the offer that Gandhi made to Jinnah a year
earlier.135
External affairs issues should be negotiated on the basis of
a specific treaty which should deal with three aspects:
(a) The strategic and military arrangements between India and
England in the future;
(b) British commercial interests in India and Indian commercial
interests in the British Empire;
(c) special obligations of the British Government in India if
any.136
The treaty should be drafted in a way to avoid the feeling
among the Indians that the British Government was “limiting
India’s freedom” and “imposing new shakle (sic) on her”. It was
necessary “to disarm suspicion in India”.137
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At the end of 1945, the British authorities took into
consideration the practical aspects of a possible partition. In the
memorandum “Demarcation of ‘Pakistan’ areas”138 the
distribution of population on the North West and North East of
India was examined, with an analysis of percentages of majorities
and minorities in the respective areas, according to the ethnic and
religious groups. The scheme included the provinces that in 1947
effectively formed Pakistan. It defined two areas: a Western zone
embracing the NWFP, “British Baluchistan”, and the cities of
Multan, Rawalpindi and Lahore, which subsequently would be
incorporated into the Pakistan part of Punjab; and an Eastern zone
including “the Rajshahi, Dacca, and Chittagong divisions of
Bengal” and Assam. This “demarcation” predated the effective
scheme of partition of 1947. Moreover, it referred to Pakistan as
a “separate state” including the above-mentioned areas, unlike
the cabinet Mission Plan of 16 May 1946, which referred to the
same territories as Muslim-majority provinces within a united
Dominion of India.
The chiefs of staff’s red lines for the Cabinet Mission
The Cabinet Mission, wanted by the newly elected Prime
Minister Clement Attlee in early 1946, was a final step towards
the transfer of power within a constitutional frame aimed at
overcoming the opposition between the Congress and the Muslim
League about India’s future political settlement. The Cabinet
Mission arrived in India on 14 March 1946. The works of the
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delegation had been carefully prepared and followed by the
Chiefs of Staff Committee. On 1st March 1946, the India Office
required the chiefs of staff’s “views on certain questions
concerning the defence of India for information of the Cabinet
Minister’s delegation which is leaving for that country in the near
future”.139 In view of “a change in the status of India”, the India
Office considered the possibility of maintaining relations with
India under a treaty. The chiefs of staffs’ reply was very careful:
Our military and political policy must develop concurrently; it
will not therefore be possible for us to go into any detail until the
political provisions of any treaty have been further elaborated,
and we do not consider that we should at this stage do more than
state the general principles which must govern our military policy
in relation to a self-governing India.140
This wait-and-see policy was meant to give room to the
adoption of the most suitable solution pending future political
developments in India. According to this principle, the British
could not “afford to allow the negotiations to break down” and,
in case of difficulties, they should modify their requirements,
rather than abandon the negotiations.
However, the chiefs of staff clearly drew what they viewed
as red lines that could not be crossed lest the whole defence
system in South Asia crumbled. These red lines included as a
main objective the continuing control of Indian airfields and ports
on the west coast, “essential for the effective control of the
Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf”.
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India is the natural supporting base for British forces operating
in the Persian Gulf area or in South East Asia (Burma, Siam,
French Indo-China and Malaya). In addition, it is a vital link in
our air communications in the Far East. Moreover, the airfields
in N.W. India are the nearest we have to the industrial areas of
the Urals and Western Siberia”.141
Also, India was important for its “industrial and supply
potential”. This had been enhanced by the realisation that, at that
time “the largest known reserves of thorium, an element of
increasing importance in the exploitation of atomic energy”, had
just been discovered in Travancore.142
It was expected India would join the British Common -
wealth, which was viewed by the British planners as assuming
an increasing importance in British defence policy after the end
of the war. India would benefit from an alliance with Britain in
terms of military assistance and protection as well as
modernisation of the armed forces and equipment, and
maintenance of internal security. British forces should station in
India for some time after independence and use India as a “base”
for British operations in the area.
As an alternative, it was supposed to sign a treaty with India,
which should cover an area “lying between the Middle East and
the present South-East Asia”143 and involved the Persian Gulf,
Afghanistan, Nepal, Ceylon, and Burma. It should be a Regional
Security Agreement under article 52 of the United Nations
Charter. The implementation of the treaty should be conditioned
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by a new Constitution and the negotiations for the constitution
and the treaty should proceed simultaneously. The India Office
was aware that “the details of the agreement are likely to be
highly contentious” and might encounter the opposition of Indian
leaders. The requirements were “that India should be internally
at peace” and, in case of war, have a government capable to have
a central unified control to co-ordinate the military operations
and supplies. India “should maintain adequate sufficient and
well-equipped land forces” and gradually develop sea and air
forces. One of the most objectionable points was
India should agree to the stationing in India both in peace and
war of a strategic reserve of British land and air forces to assist
in regional defence but not available for internal security duties.
The use of these troops would have to be controlled by an
authority responsible to H.M.G. and they would have to be under
the direct administration of H.M.G. in every respect.144
Consequently, India should provide installations, especially
aerodromes, facilities, and accommodation for the stationing
British forces. A combined British and Indian command should
be set up, “under a Supreme Commander appointed by H.M.G.”,
who should respond to both governments. A sufficient number
of senior British officers should be retained in India, “in order to
ensure the continued efficiency of the Indian forces”. The Indian
government could receive the services of British forces for
frontier operations, under consultation at all stages of “a British
authority responsible to H.M.G.” and “approval to their use”.
Although this requirement was not conditioned by the
constitutional settlement, it might be
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felt that the North-East Frontier is of such importance to regional
security that H.M.G. should undertake a continuing obligation in
respect of it.
It would not seem possible to accept an arrangement under which
an Indian government has unfettered discretion in frontier policy
and policy towards Afghanistan and at the same time is able to
call upon British troops and air forces to deal with incursions and
disturbances arising in the field of that policy.145
A financial agreement should be reached regarding the
incidence of costs of the British troops stationing in India. The
India Office was aware this point was “highly controversial”
because any new Indian government was likely to refuse “the
continuance of defence expenditure at the pre-war levels”. A
possible arrangement was, as during the war, that India meet the
expenditure of the maintenance of the troops while Great Britain
provided equipment and training. Regarding the defence of India
and Britain’s economic and strategic interests in India and the
Middle East, the Labour’s aims and its “commitment to
empire”146 did not differ from those of the Conservatives. Attlee,
who was defence minister until 1946, accorded to defence the
same priority of his Conservative predecessor.
At this stage, Pakistan still represented a complication
because it was considered “indefensible and probably incapable
of maintaining the forces required” and, in case Pakistan would
be overrun, India would be indefensible as well. However,
Pakistan was not totally rejected as a possible option. In case
Pakistan materialised, only advisable an adequate co-ordination
between Indian and Pakistan forces was advisable. The most
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attractive aspect was that, most probably, Pakistan under Jinnah’s
leadership would opt to remain within the British empire and to
join the British Commonwealth, and, ultimately, be part of the
British defence system:
H.M.G. should not commit themselves in advance to implement
the outcome of each of two separate Constitution-making Bodies
if in the result two such Bodies have to be set up. There is reason
to think that Jinnah envisages Pakistan within the Empire and
receiving substantial defence assistance from H.M.G. On this
assumption he relies upon the passage in the Cripps’ Offer which
says that non-acceding Provinces may retain their existing
constitutional position but shall receive the same full status as the
Indian Union.147
On 11 April, the Cabinet delegation sent a telegram to the
British Government, addressed to the prime minister and the
viceroy. The telegram started as follows:
On our directive we are enjoined to see that any scheme that we
accept makes adequate provision for the defence of India and the
adjoining areas.148
The Cabinet Mission’s negotiation and the relevance of
the strategic imperative
The delegation had already prepared Schemes A and B to
be discussed: respectively a united India with Hindu majority and
Muslim majority provinces, or two separate states, a Hindu
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majority India and a Muslim majority Pakistan. The delegation
related the two options to the defence of India.149 In case of
separation,
the defence would not be very effective as small Pakistan would
itself be weak and it would be strengthened only in so far as it
would rely upon its treaty with Hindustan.150
According to the Cabinet Mission delegates, under Scheme
B, the two countries would be tied up by a “Treaty of alliance
offensive and defensive”.
The Cabinet delegation was under pressure to find an
agreement, because it was “the first requirement towards an
effective Defence”. If an agreement would not be reached, the
delegation feared widespread chaos in India as a consequence
and the impossibility of implementing the defence of the region.
The Cabinet delegation would prefer an agreement under Scheme
A, but this might “prove impossible of attainment”.
We hope, therefore, that you will agree to our working for an
agreement on the basis of Scheme B if this seems to us to be the
only chance of agreed settlement.151
The viceroy approved this line of conduct.152 The prime
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minister acknowledged a settlement under Scheme A was
preferable, but if Scheme B was the only possible chance of
agreement, he allowed the delegation to work for a settlement
under Scheme B.
The prime minister explained the views of the chiefs of
staff, who reckoned that “a loose all India federation”153 was far
better than the adoption of Scheme B, but recognised it was
impossible to achieve. An agreement on Scheme B was
preferable than “no agreement at all”, in spite of the
“disadvantages” it involved. The main flaw in Scheme B was that
Pakistan lies across the two entrances to India from Peshwar (sic)
to the sea in the West and from the Himalayas to the sea in the
East. In her hand would lie the responsibility to bar or open the
road into Hindustan. Air bases from which India can be attacked
lie in Coviet (sic) Central Asia and in Western China. The easiest
and quickest routes to the large cities of India from these bases
lie over the territories of Pakistan, both in the West and East of
India. Similarly the air bases from which counter-measures can
be taken lie mainly in Pakistan. It can therefore be said that the
territory of Pakistan is vital to the defence of India as a whole.154
One of the main shortcomings of Scheme B was that
separation would destroy the integrity of the Indian army “which
is now strong and well-equipped”. The chiefs of staff envisaged
the risk that, if divided, the forces of India, Pakistan, and the
States would just combine their respective weakness and develop
separate tactical views and objectives. Even in the slight chance
that all acted in favour of the defence of India, the “co-operation
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would be far from easy unless all acknowledged a central
directing authority”. Furthermore, the area that would form
Pakistan had no industrial infrastructures: Karachi was “at the
end of a long and vulnerable railway” and Chittagong was “in a
similar exposed position”. The chiefs of staff predicted Pakistan
would rely upon India for the production of arms in case of war.
It was expected Pakistan would not be capable to defend India
in case of war.155
To sum up, Scheme B will have to be accepted if the only
alternative is complete failure to reach agreement and consequent
chaos. But India will be confronted by grave dangers as a result
of this partition, and if Scheme B has to be adopted, every effort
should be made to obtain agreement for some form of Central
Defence Council to be set up which will include not only Pakistan
Hindustan and the Indian States, but also Burma and Ceylon.156
After the failure of the 16 May Plan that, ultimately, was
based on Scheme A, the settlement of India went on according
to Scheme B. The final result of the Cabinet Mission was,
therefore, the sanction of India’s partition.157
The British (failed) search for a treaty of mutual military
assistance between the U.K. and independent India
During the negotiations, it became increasingly clear that
Nehru would head the Indian government once independence
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was reached. This created uncertainty among British authorities.
Although, during the Cabinet Mission negotiations, the British
delegates and the viceroy seemed to lean towards Nehru and the
Congress, they were nevertheless concerned about Nehru’s views
regarding India’s foreign policy and future relations with the
United Kingdom. On 20 May 1946, the chiefs of staff discussed
a letter received from General Auchinleck, where he warned that
the “new Indian Government” might demand the withdrawal of
the British forces, including the R.A.F., from India.158 This event
would have very serious implications as regards the availability
of communications and bases between the Middle East and South
East Asia Zones.159
In a subsequent report, the chiefs of staff carefully examined
the event that “a centralised Indian government comes into
power, which will provide for unified control of defence”160 and
required the withdrawal of British forces. India’s strategic
importance was described as follows:
(a) India possesses great man-power resources. We shall therefore
require to use India as a main support area.161
(b) Airfields in India provide the nearest bases for attack on
industrial areas of the Urals and Western Siberia, and are essential
for the maintenance of our communications to the Far East.
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(c) Bases in India are important to our command of the Indian
Ocean, in particular to the maintenance of our communications
to South East Asia and the Persian Gulf.162
For these reasons, Indian armed forces should remain
modern and efficient, while India should be politically stable, “to
ensure her security as a military base and as a source of both man-
power and industrial war potential”.163 The British Military
expected to be able to rapidly introduce British forces in case of
war and India would accept British military assistance.
These observations became the basis to draft a treaty of
mutual military assistance between Great Britain and India.
Between 20 June and the beginning of July 1946, the Joint
Planning Staff was preparing the military clauses to be included
in the treaty with India. Civilian and military staff from the India
Office, the Join Planning Staff, and the War Staff were discussing
the issue.164
Article 1 of the first draft of the treaty established
The Government of the United Kingdom … and the Government
of India … recognize that the defence of their territories is of vital
importance to the one no less than to the other, and they
accordingly agree thereby to consult and co-operate to each other
to the fullest possible extent in all matters relating thereto.165
India should undertake to allow the British forces to
supplement the Indian air and naval forces, in case of inter -
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national emergency, and to “provide the operational and
administrative base facilities required for the support of the
British forces”166 operating in India or in the adjacent areas. A
list of the “mutually agreed” bases was enclosed to the text as
Annexure C, but unfortunately it is not in the file. In particular,
the Indian government was supposed “to agree to grant to the
British Government … the use of airfields for long range
strategic bombers”.167 The Indian forces had to remain modern
and efficient to assist the British forces and, for this purpose, the
Indian government should accept the assistance of British officers
and instructors. The British government undertook to provide
“arms, ammunitions, equipment, ships and aeroplanes of the
latest available pattern”.168 The British forces should “be under
their own Commanders”, appointed by and directly responsible
to the British government. The cost of equipment and assistance
should be met by the Indian government. The conclusion of the
treaty was the “condition of implementing the new
constitution”.169 Such a Treaty has never been subscribed, at least
not that version. This was a basic draft, probably subject to
development after negotiations with Indian leaders.
When drafting the treaty, the British officers counted the
chickens before they hatched. They expected to “freely”
negotiate the treaty with the new Indian government, but they
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were also aware that “negotiations of its actual terms” might
carry “some distance with the Interim Government”.170
Nehru had already expressed his views regarding the treaty
in unequivocal terms at the 10 July press interview:
When the Congress stated that the constituent was to be a
sovereign body, the Cabinet Mission’s reply was more or less
“yes”, subject to two considerations: first, a proper arrangement
for the minorities, and secondly, a treaty between India and
England. I wish the Mission had stated that both these matters
were not controversial. … It is also obvious that if there is any
kind of peaceful changeover, in India, it is bound to result in some
kind of a treaty with Britain.
What exactly the treaty will be I cannot say. But if the British
Government presume to tell us they are going to hold anything
in India, because they do not agree either in regard to the
minorities or in regard to the treaty, we should not accept that
position … if there is the slightest attempt at imposition, we shall
have no treaty … and, therefore, these two limiting factors to the
sovereignty of the constituent assembly are not acceptable to
us.171
The attitude of the Indian leaders, and in particular of Nehru,
made the high ranks of the British army and administration
uncertain about future military co-operation with the Indian
government. On 30 August 1946 Lord Ismay wrote to the prime
minister, warning that if India opted for independence, rather
choosing the dominion status,
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the chances of obtaining even our minimum requirements are
remote, since the Indians will probably be just as suspicious and
jealous of their new found sovereignty as the Egyptians had
been.172
Regarding Nehru’s position, the British military staff could
not ignore that
Nehru has already referred in public statements that it is in his
intention that India should remain detached from both the two
main blocks in world affairs and should not become “the
plaything of the great powers”. It might well seem to an
independent Indian Government that their interest lies in
remaining neutral in any world conflict, that they are not
vulnerable from any direction except from Russia through
Afghanistan, and that if we become involved in war with Russia
we should not have the strength necessary to protect India from
being overrun in the early stages.173
India’s partition as the most convenient option for the
preservation of British interests in South Asia
After the failure of the Cabinet Mission, the British
government knew partition was almost unavoidable and
suspected that the Congress would not accept any external
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interference or conditioning in its defence and foreign policy. The
British military officers maintained the apparently non-committal
attitude they adopted when the Cabinet Mission negotiations
started and they maintained it until the eve of India’s
independence and partition, in June 1947. Not only did they not
openly suggest to Indian leaders to opt for partition, but they did
not even openly discuss it among themselves and did not publicly
support any decision favouring it.
However, between the end of 1946 and June 1947, they
carefully examined four alternatives: a united and independent
India within the British defence shelter; a united and independent
India outside it; a united independent India within the British
Commonwealth; and a fourth alternative, profusely discussed
between September 1946 and June 1947, namely partition. The
military implications of this event were examined and finally this
option cancelled all others: if partition materialised, the
requirement to make India part of either the British defence
system or the British Commonwealth was less compelling. The
British military and politicians had carefully considered the
possibility that India entered the Commonwealth since 1944, and
had carefully and systematically scrutinised all options, included
partition between April 1946 and the summer of 1947.174 These
options were examined and discussed against the backdrop
represented by the British government’s overriding objective of
preserving Britain’s hegemony in South and Western Asia after
the end of World War II.
Britain privileged an Asian order gravitating toward a united
India, but since 1942, when British interests in South Asia
seemed to be at risk not because of the war but because of India
desire of unconditioned political freedom, the British government
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developed an alternative solution, based on the partition of the
Indian subcontinent. In other words, when it was clear that the
most convenient option for the preservation of Britain’s
economic and strategic requirements in the region was India’s
partition, the British administrators allowed it, without doing
much to avoid it and without doing much to avoid the human
tragedy and all political consequences that followed.
Claude Auchinleck, who strongly opposed the partition of
the army, ultimately contemplated the possibility to detach parts
of territory of the Anglo-Indian Empire for British strategic
requirements. In a note of April 1945, Auchinleck observed
Baluchistan had “few facilities” at that time but, although roads,
railways, a port and more airfields were required, these
shortcomings were not insuperable. Even though irrigation
should be improved by modern technical systems, the country
was considered “extremely fertile” and its climate good.
Ultimately, strategic considerations prevailed on concerns.
General Auchinleck wondered whether a self-governing India
would
include Baluchistan in its boundaries. The country is a financial
burden on India at present – the inhabitants are not Indians – the
language is not Indian – in fact Baluchistan pertains to Central
Asia rather than to India. The population is sparse and it might
be possible to colonise the country with Poles or other Europeans
who can not (sic) find asylum elsewhere.
The advantage of Baluchistan as an “Imperial” enclave containing
a strategic land reserve of air and land forces would be great
indeed not only to the whole Commonwealth so far as our
interests in Southern Asia and the Indian Ocean are concerned
but also to India which it would automatically protect against
invasion from Afghanistan.175
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175 IOR L/WS/1/985, Note on Baluchistan as an “Imperial” enclave,
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Baluchistan would become the largest of the four provinces
which formed Pakistan.
The viceroy and the high ranks of the British army, who
until the last moment were uncertain if independent India would
be divided or united, endorsed the partition when, at a meeting
with Lord Mountbatten in early May 1947, Jinnah undertook that
Pakistan would opt for the Dominion Status, and therefore remain
within the British Commonwealth.176
According to Anita Inder Singh,
The British favoured a transfer of power to a united India, which
would keep the army undivided, and be of the greatest advantage
to them strategically.177
This is certainly true, but it is equally true that the British
did not seriously oppose the idea of Pakistan and, with their
apparently inept attitude, ultimately favoured its creation. After
all, with India’s partition, Britain could take advantage from
either state: of both wings of Pakistan for their strategic position,
and of India for its prestige and resources.
There is no evidence that Great Britain had an active role in
causing partition. The British authorities have not conspired to
divide India. They have never loudly proclaimed its necessity
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signed by the Command in Chief in India, General Auchinleck. The
record refers to a report PHP (45) 15 (O) of April 1945 concerning
Baluchistan and is among papers of 1946.
176 IOR L/WS/1/1030, Copy of a minute from dominion secretary to
the prime minister dated 9 May 1947. The examination of the sources
relating to the final events that brought to India’s partition and to the
issue of India entering the Commonwealth is still going on. The
findings will be published in a subsequent essay.
177 A. Inder Singh, The Origins, p. 151.
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and have never publicly supported it. However, they have
discussed it confidentially, especially from the second half of
1946. This discussion resulted in the conclusion that, if a decision
between unity and partition was required, Britain’s defence
interests were the priority, even at the cost of dividing the Indian
subcontinent.178 If British interests could not be ensured by a
united India, they should be by Pakistan. When it became clear
that Pakistan could better secure Britain’s interests, the viceroy
and his staff suddenly decided to divide India. This was in Spring
1947.
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178 IOR, R/3/1/105, telegram from Cabinet Delegation to Cabinet
Office, 11th April 1946.
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